Yizhou Zhang
Publications
On the Implicit Reward Overfitting and the Low-rank Dynamics in RLVR
Recent extensive research has demonstrated that the enhanced reasoning capabilities acquired by models through Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) are primarily concentrated within the rank-1 components. Predicated on this observation, we employed Periodic Rank-1 Substitution and identified a counterintuitive phenomenon: RLVR may exhibit implicit reward overfitting to the training dataset. Specifically, the model can achieve satisfactory performance on the test set even when its rewards remain relatively low during the training process. Furthermore, we characterize three distinct properties of RL training: (1) The effective rank-1 component in RLVR don't maintain other model knowledge except mathematical reasoning capability. (2) RLVR fundamentally functions by optimizing a specific singular spectrum. The distribution of singular values of almost all linear layers in RLVR-trained model behaves like heavy-tailed distribution. (3) the left singular vectors associated with rank-1 components demonstrate a stronger alignment tendency during training, which echoes the discovery that RLVR is optimizing sampling efficiency in essence. Taken together, our findings and analysis further reveal how RLVR shapes model parameters and offer potential insights for improving existing RL paradigms or other training paradigms to implement continual learning.
Training Generalizable Collaborative Agents via Strategic Risk Aversion
Many emerging agentic paradigms require agents to collaborate with one another (or people) to achieve shared goals. Unfortunately, existing approaches to learning policies for such collaborative problems produce brittle solutions that fail when paired with new partners. We attribute these failures to a combination of free-riding during training and a lack of strategic robustness. To address these problems, we study the concept of strategic risk aversion and interpret it as a principled inductive bias for generalizable cooperation with unseen partners. While strategically risk-averse players are robust to deviations in their partner's behavior by design, we show that, in collaborative games, they also (1) can have better equilibrium outcomes than those at classical game-theoretic concepts like Nash, and (2) exhibit less or no free-riding. Inspired by these insights, we develop a multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm that integrates strategic risk aversion into standard policy optimization methods. Our empirical results across collaborative benchmarks (including an LLM collaboration task) validate our theory and demonstrate that our approach consistently achieves reliable collaboration with heterogeneous and previously unseen partners across collaborative tasks.