Souradip Chakraborty
Publications
Agentic Critical Training
Training large language models (LLMs) as autonomous agents often begins with imitation learning, but it only teaches agents what to do without understanding why: agents never contrast successful actions against suboptimal alternatives and thus lack awareness of action quality. Recent approaches attempt to address this by introducing self-reflection supervision derived from contrasts between expert and alternative actions. However, the training paradigm fundamentally remains imitation learning: the model imitates pre-constructed reflection text rather than learning to reason autonomously. We propose Agentic Critical Training (ACT), a reinforcement learning paradigm that trains agents to identify the better action among alternatives. By rewarding whether the model's judgment is correct, ACT drives the model to autonomously develop reasoning about action quality, producing genuine self-reflection rather than imitating it. Across three challenging agent benchmarks, ACT consistently improves agent performance when combined with different post-training methods. It achieves an average improvement of 5.07 points over imitation learning and 4.62 points over reinforcement learning. Compared to approaches that inject reflection capability through knowledge distillation, ACT also demonstrates clear advantages, yielding an average improvement of 2.42 points. Moreover, ACT enables strong out-of-distribution generalization on agentic benchmarks and improves performance on general reasoning benchmarks without any reasoning-specific training data, highlighting the value of our method. These results suggest that ACT is a promising path toward developing more reflective and capable LLM agents.
Why Pass@k Optimization Can Degrade Pass@1: Prompt Interference in LLM Post-training
Pass@k is a widely used performance metric for verifiable large language model tasks, including mathematical reasoning, code generation, and short-answer reasoning. It defines success if any of $k$ independently sampled solutions passes a verifier. This multi-sample inference metric has motivated inference-aware fine-tuning methods that directly optimize pass@$k$. However, prior work reports a recurring trade-off: pass@k improves while pass@1 degrades under such methods. This trade-off is practically important because pass@1 often remains a hard operational constraint due to latency and cost budgets, imperfect verifier coverage, and the need for a reliable single-shot fallback. We study the origin of this trade-off and provide a theoretical characterization of when pass@k policy optimization can reduce pass@1 through gradient conflict induced by prompt interference. We show that pass@$k$ policy gradients can conflict with pass@1 gradients because pass@$k$ optimization implicitly reweights prompts toward low-success prompts; when these prompts are what we term negatively interfering, their upweighting can rotate the pass@k update direction away from the pass@1 direction. We illustrate our theoretical findings with large language model experiments on verifiable mathematical reasoning tasks.
Safety Recovery in Reasoning Models Is Only a Few Early Steering Steps Away
Reinforcement learning (RL) based post-training for explicit chain-of-thought (e.g., GRPO) improves the reasoning ability of multimodal large-scale reasoning models (MLRMs). But recent evidence shows that it can simultaneously degrade safety alignment and increase jailbreak success rates. We propose SafeThink, a lightweight inference-time defense that treats safety recovery as a satisficing constraint rather than a maximization objective. SafeThink monitors the evolving reasoning trace with a safety reward model and conditionally injects an optimized short corrective prefix ("Wait, think safely") only when the safety threshold is violated. In our evaluations across six open-source MLRMs and four jailbreak benchmarks (JailbreakV-28K, Hades, FigStep, and MM-SafetyBench), SafeThink reduces attack success rates by 30-60% (e.g., LlamaV-o1: 63.33% to 5.74% on JailbreakV-28K, R1-Onevision: 69.07% to 5.65% on Hades) while preserving reasoning performance (MathVista accuracy: 65.20% to 65.00%). A key empirical finding from our experiments is that safety recovery is often only a few steering steps away: intervening in the first 1-3 reasoning steps typically suffices to redirect the full generation toward safe completions.