Yiyou Sun
Publications
Strategy Executability in Mathematical Reasoning: Leveraging Human-Model Differences for Effective Guidance
Example-based guidance is widely used to improve mathematical reasoning at inference time, yet its effectiveness is highly unstable across problems and models-even when the guidance is correct and problem-relevant. We show that this instability arises from a previously underexplored gap between strategy usage-whether a reasoning strategy appears in successful solutions-and strategy executability-whether the strategy remains effective when instantiated as guidance for a target model. Through a controlled analysis of paired human-written and model-generated solutions, we identify a systematic dissociation between usage and executability: human- and model-derived strategies differ in structured, domain-dependent ways, leading to complementary strengths and consistent source-dependent reversals under guidance. Building on this diagnosis, we propose Selective Strategy Retrieval (SSR), a test-time framework that explicitly models executability by selectively retrieving and combining strategies using empirical, multi-route, source-aware signals. Across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks, SSR yields reliable and consistent improvements over direct solving, in-context learning, and single-source guidance, improving accuracy by up to $+13$ points on AIME25 and $+5$ points on Apex for compact reasoning models. Code and benchmark are publicly available at: https://github.com/lwd17/strategy-execute-pipeline.
Unsafer in Many Turns: Benchmarking and Defending Multi-Turn Safety Risks in Tool-Using Agents
LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly capable, yet their safety lags behind. This creates a gap between what agents can do and should do. This gap widens as agents engage in multi-turn interactions and employ diverse tools, introducing new risks overlooked by existing benchmarks. To systematically scale safety testing into multi-turn, tool-realistic settings, we propose a principled taxonomy that transforms single-turn harmful tasks into multi-turn attack sequences. Using this taxonomy, we construct MT-AgentRisk (Multi-Turn Agent Risk Benchmark), the first benchmark to evaluate multi-turn tool-using agent safety. Our experiments reveal substantial safety degradation: the Attack Success Rate (ASR) increases by 16% on average across open and closed models in multi-turn settings. To close this gap, we propose ToolShield, a training-free, tool-agnostic, self-exploration defense: when encountering a new tool, the agent autonomously generates test cases, executes them to observe downstream effects, and distills safety experiences for deployment. Experiments show that ToolShield effectively reduces ASR by 30% on average in multi-turn interactions. Our code is available at https://github.com/CHATS-lab/ToolShield.