Zeyu Shen
Publications
Using Cognitive Models to Improve Language Model Simulation of Human Persuasion Games
People make decisions differently in strategic interactions. Some update beliefs like a Bayesian; others exhibit biases like motivated reasoning. Although creators of large language models use simulated humans for safety evaluations and training, they often fail to cover this breadth of human behavior. We argue that cognitive science and economics provide a convenient tool for doing so, making use of mathematical models of human decision-making. We propose an approach that we call Equation-to-Behavior Prompting for guiding large language models to match cognitive models, and evaluate this approach on persuasion games based on legal decision-making. We find that large models can approximate equation-based specifications -- Bayesian updating, affine distortion, motivated updating, and Grether's $α$-$β$ model -- using prompting, but small models fail to do so. However, training small models with reinforcement learning to adhere to mathematical rules, Equation-to-Behavior RL, reduces belief error by 26.5% in out-of-distribution parameterizations. We show that these simulations can help create diverse training environments; training small models to consider different kinds of decision-makers improves average belief change by 2.5%--12% over Bayesian-only training, even when persuading GPT-5-mini. Our work could improve human simulations for training and evaluation in increasingly realistic settings, and could also enable novel research into more complicated mathematical models of human decision-making.
The Geometry of Alignment Collapse: When Fine-Tuning Breaks Safety
Fine-tuning aligned language models on benign tasks unpredictably degrades safety guardrails, even when training data contains no harmful content and developers have no adversarial intent. We show that the prevailing explanation, that fine-tuning updates should be orthogonal to safety-critical directions in high-dimensional parameter space, offers false reassurance: we show this orthogonality is structurally unstable and collapses under the dynamics of gradient descent. We then resolve this through a novel geometric analysis, proving that alignment concentrates in low-dimensional subspaces with sharp curvature, creating a brittle structure that first-order methods cannot detect or defend. While initial fine-tuning updates may indeed avoid these subspaces, the curvature of the fine-tuning loss generates second-order acceleration that systematically steers trajectories into alignment-sensitive regions. We formalize this mechanism through the Alignment Instability Condition, three geometric properties that, when jointly satisfied, lead to safety degradation. Our main result establishes a quartic scaling law: alignment loss grows with the fourth power of training time, governed by the sharpness of alignment geometry and the strength of curvature coupling between the fine-tuning task and safety-critical parameters. These results expose a structural blind spot in the current safety paradigm. The dominant approaches to safe fine-tuning address only the initial snapshot of a fundamentally dynamic problem. Alignment fragility is not a bug to be patched; it is an intrinsic geometric property of gradient descent on curved manifolds. Our results motivate the development of curvature-aware methods, and we hope will further enable a shift in alignment safety analysis from reactive red-teaming to predictive diagnostics for open-weight model deployment.