Fuyao Zhang
Publications
Adversarial Attacks for Good: A Survey of Proactive Protection across the Visual Content Lifecycle
Once visual content enters an AI pipeline, its owner often retains little technical control over how it is used. Legal and regulatory remedies can address misuse, but many technical interventions must be applied earlier, when content is released or accessed. This survey examines the protective paradigm that has grown around this intervention point, which we call \emph{adversarial attacks for good}. Perturbations and structured signals long studied as attacks on learned models are instead applied by data owners, creators, platforms, or auditors to disrupt unauthorized automation or support later accountability. Five research communities have arrived at this inversion largely independently, each addressing a different stage of a visual asset's lifecycle: privacy filters against unwanted recognition at sharing time, unlearnable examples against unauthorized training, generative safeguards against malicious editing or imitation, adversarial CAPTCHAs for access control against automated agents, and provenance mechanisms for post-circulation attribution. Although developed in separate venues with incompatible success criteria, many of these methods exploit persistent gaps between human perception, semantic interpretation, and machine inference, suggesting that the paradigm remains relevant as visual pipelines evolve toward multimodal models and autonomous agents. To make their claims comparable, we evaluate all five families along shared axes of transferability, adaptability, and deployment readiness. Across the lifecycle, we find that most protections are still validated mainly against static or weakly adaptive adversaries, while evidence beyond controlled benchmarks remains scarce. We close by consolidating cross-stage countermeasures and open problems for robust, composable, and deployable owner-side protection.
XDomainBench: Diagnosing Reasoning Collapse in High-Dimensional Scientific Knowledge Composition
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for knowledge synthesis, yet their capacity for compositional generalization in scientific knowledge remains under-characterized. Existing benchmarks primarily focus on single-turn restricted scenarios, failing to capture the capability boundaries exposed by real-world interactive scientific workflows. To address this, we introduce XDomainBench, a diagnostic benchmark for interactive interdisciplinary scientific reasoning. We formalize the composition order and mixture structure to enable systematic stress-testing from single-discipline to inter-disciplinary, comprising 8,598 interactive sessions across 20 domains and 4 task categories, with 8 realistic trajectory patterns covering difficulty and domain-mixture dynamics, simulating real AI4S scenarios. Large-scale evaluation of LLMs reveals a systematic reasoning collapse as composition order increases, stemming from two root causes: (i) direct difficulty increases induced by domain composition, and (ii) indirect interaction-amplified failures where trajectory patterns trigger error accumulation, reasoning breaks, and domain confusion, ultimately leading to session collapse.
ICON: Indirect Prompt Injection Defense for Agents based on Inference-Time Correction
Large Language Model (LLM) agents are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions in retrieved content hijack the agent's execution. Existing defenses typically rely on strict filtering or refusal mechanisms, which suffer from a critical limitation: over-refusal, prematurely terminating valid agentic workflows. We propose ICON, a probing-to-mitigation framework that neutralizes attacks while preserving task continuity. Our key insight is that IPI attacks leave distinct over-focusing signatures in the latent space. We introduce a Latent Space Trace Prober to detect attacks based on high intensity scores. Subsequently, a Mitigating Rectifier performs surgical attention steering that selectively manipulate adversarial query key dependencies while amplifying task relevant elements to restore the LLM's functional trajectory. Extensive evaluations on multiple backbones show that ICON achieves a competitive 0.4% ASR, matching commercial grade detectors, while yielding a over 50% task utility gain. Furthermore, ICON demonstrates robust Out of Distribution(OOD) generalization and extends effectively to multi-modal agents, establishing a superior balance between security and efficiency.