Tamar Rott Shaham
Publications
Pitfalls in Evaluating Interpretability Agents
Automated interpretability systems aim to reduce the need for human labor and scale analysis to increasingly large models and diverse tasks. Recent efforts toward this goal leverage large language models (LLMs) at increasing levels of autonomy, ranging from fixed one-shot workflows to fully autonomous interpretability agents. This shift creates a corresponding need to scale evaluation approaches to keep pace with both the volume and complexity of generated explanations. We investigate this challenge in the context of automated circuit analysis -- explaining the roles of model components when performing specific tasks. To this end, we build an agentic system in which a research agent iteratively designs experiments and refines hypotheses. When evaluated against human expert explanations across six circuit analysis tasks in the literature, the system appears competitive. However, closer examination reveals several pitfalls of replication-based evaluation: human expert explanations can be subjective or incomplete, outcome-based comparisons obscure the research process, and LLM-based systems may reproduce published findings via memorization or informed guessing. To address some of these pitfalls, we propose an unsupervised intrinsic evaluation based on the functional interchangeability of model components. Our work demonstrates fundamental challenges in evaluating complex automated interpretability systems and reveals key limitations of replication-based evaluation.
Agents of Chaos
We report an exploratory red-teaming study of autonomous language-model-powered agents deployed in a live laboratory environment with persistent memory, email accounts, Discord access, file systems, and shell execution. Over a two-week period, twenty AI researchers interacted with the agents under benign and adversarial conditions. Focusing on failures emerging from the integration of language models with autonomy, tool use, and multi-party communication, we document eleven representative case studies. Observed behaviors include unauthorized compliance with non-owners, disclosure of sensitive information, execution of destructive system-level actions, denial-of-service conditions, uncontrolled resource consumption, identity spoofing vulnerabilities, cross-agent propagation of unsafe practices, and partial system takeover. In several cases, agents reported task completion while the underlying system state contradicted those reports. We also report on some of the failed attempts. Our findings establish the existence of security-, privacy-, and governance-relevant vulnerabilities in realistic deployment settings. These behaviors raise unresolved questions regarding accountability, delegated authority, and responsibility for downstream harms, and warrant urgent attention from legal scholars, policymakers, and researchers across disciplines. This report serves as an initial empirical contribution to that broader conversation.