Reuth Mirsky
Publications
The Intelligent Disobedience Game: Formulating Disobedience in Stackelberg Games and Markov Decision Processes
In shared autonomy, a critical tension arises when an automated assistant must choose between obeying a human's instruction and deliberately overriding it to prevent harm. This safety-critical behavior is known as intelligent disobedience. To formalize this dynamic, this paper introduces the Intelligent Disobedience Game (IDG), a sequential game-theoretic framework based on Stackelberg games that models the interaction between a human leader and an assistive follower operating under asymmetric information. It characterizes optimal strategies for both agents across multi-step scenarios, identifying strategic phenomena such as ``safety traps,'' where the system indefinitely avoids harm but fails to achieve the human's goal. The IDG provides a needed mathematical foundation that enables both the algorithmic development of agents that can learn safe non-compliance and the empirical study of how humans perceive and trust disobedient AI. The paper further translates the IDG into a shared control Multi-Agent Markov Decision Process representation, forming a compact computational testbed for training reinforcement learning agents.
Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Advancing Artificial Intelligence through Theory of Mind
This volume includes a selection of papers presented at the 2nd Workshop on Advancing Artificial Intelligence through Theory of Mind held at AAAI 2026 in Singapore on 26th January 2026. The purpose of this volume is to provide an open access and curated anthology for the ToM and AI research community.
Agents of Chaos
We report an exploratory red-teaming study of autonomous language-model-powered agents deployed in a live laboratory environment with persistent memory, email accounts, Discord access, file systems, and shell execution. Over a two-week period, twenty AI researchers interacted with the agents under benign and adversarial conditions. Focusing on failures emerging from the integration of language models with autonomy, tool use, and multi-party communication, we document eleven representative case studies. Observed behaviors include unauthorized compliance with non-owners, disclosure of sensitive information, execution of destructive system-level actions, denial-of-service conditions, uncontrolled resource consumption, identity spoofing vulnerabilities, cross-agent propagation of unsafe practices, and partial system takeover. In several cases, agents reported task completion while the underlying system state contradicted those reports. We also report on some of the failed attempts. Our findings establish the existence of security-, privacy-, and governance-relevant vulnerabilities in realistic deployment settings. These behaviors raise unresolved questions regarding accountability, delegated authority, and responsibility for downstream harms, and warrant urgent attention from legal scholars, policymakers, and researchers across disciplines. This report serves as an initial empirical contribution to that broader conversation.
GRAIL: Goal Recognition Alignment through Imitation Learning
Understanding an agent's goals from its behavior is fundamental to aligning AI systems with human intentions. Existing goal recognition methods typically rely on an optimal goal-oriented policy representation, which may differ from the actor's true behavior and hinder the accurate recognition of their goal. To address this gap, this paper introduces Goal Recognition Alignment through Imitation Learning (GRAIL), which leverages imitation learning and inverse reinforcement learning to learn one goal-directed policy for each candidate goal directly from (potentially suboptimal) demonstration trajectories. By scoring an observed partial trajectory with each learned goal-directed policy in a single forward pass, GRAIL retains the one-shot inference capability of classical goal recognition while leveraging learned policies that can capture suboptimal and systematically biased behavior. Across the evaluated domains, GRAIL increases the F1-score by more than 0.5 under systematically biased optimal behavior, achieves gains of approximately 0.1-0.3 under suboptimal behavior, and yields improvements of up to 0.4 under noisy optimal trajectories, while remaining competitive in fully optimal settings. This work contributes toward scalable and robust models for interpreting agent goals in uncertain environments.