S

Stephen T. Casper

Total Citations
78
h-index
4
Papers
3

Publications

#1 2602.06911v1 Feb 06, 2026

TamperBench: Systematically Stress-Testing LLM Safety Under Fine-Tuning and Tampering

As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks. However, there is no standard approach to evaluate tamper resistance. Varied data sets, metrics, and tampering configurations make it difficult to compare safety, utility, and robustness across different models and defenses. To this end, we introduce TamperBench, the first unified framework to systematically evaluate the tamper resistance of LLMs. TamperBench (i) curates a repository of state-of-the-art weight-space fine-tuning attacks and latent-space representation attacks; (ii) enables realistic adversarial evaluation through systematic hyperparameter sweeps per attack-model pair; and (iii) provides both safety and utility evaluations. TamperBench requires minimal additional code to specify any fine-tuning configuration, alignment-stage defense method, and metric suite while ensuring end-to-end reproducibility. We use TamperBench to evaluate 21 open-weight LLMs, including defense-augmented variants, across nine tampering threats using standardized safety and capability metrics with hyperparameter sweeps per model-attack pair. This yields novel insights, including effects of post-training on tamper resistance, that jailbreak-tuning is typically the most severe attack, and that Triplet emerges as a leading alignment-stage defense. Code is available at: https://github.com/criticalml-uw/TamperBench

Kellin Pelrine Matthew Kowal Stephen T. Casper Tom Tseng Saad Hossain +6
1 Citations
#2 2601.08005v2 Jan 12, 2026

Internal Deployment Gaps in AI Regulation

Frontier AI regulations primarily focus on systems deployed to external users, where deployment is more visible and subject to outside scrutiny. However, high-stakes applications can occur internally when companies deploy highly capable systems within their own organizations, such as for automating R&D, accelerating critical business processes, and handling sensitive proprietary data. This paper examines how frontier AI regulations in the United States and European Union in 2025 handle internal deployment. We identify three gaps that could cause internally-deployed systems to evade intended oversight: (1) scope ambiguity that allows internal systems to evade regulatory obligations, (2) point-in-time compliance assessments that fail to capture the continuous evolution of internal systems, and (3) information asymmetries that subvert regulatory awareness and oversight. We then analyze why these gaps persist, examining tensions around measurability, incentives, and information access. Finally, we map potential approaches to address them and their associated tradeoffs. By understanding these patterns, we hope that policy choices around internally deployed AI systems can be made deliberately rather than incidentally.

Stephen T. Casper Joe Kwon
0 Citations
#3 2601.08005v3 Jan 12, 2026

Internal Deployment Gaps in AI Regulation

Frontier AI regulations primarily focus on systems deployed to external users, where deployment is more visible and subject to outside scrutiny. However, high-stakes applications can occur internally when companies deploy highly capable systems within their own organizations, such as for automating R&D, accelerating critical business processes, and handling sensitive proprietary data. This paper examines how frontier AI regulations in the United States and European Union in 2025 handle internal deployment. We identify three gaps that could cause internally-deployed systems to evade intended oversight: (1) scope ambiguity that allows internal systems to evade regulatory obligations, (2) point-in-time compliance assessments that fail to capture the continuous evolution of internal systems, and (3) information asymmetries that subvert regulatory awareness and oversight. We then analyze why these gaps persist, examining tensions around measurability, incentives, and information access. Finally, we map potential approaches to address them and their associated tradeoffs. By understanding these patterns, we hope that policy choices around internally deployed AI systems can be made deliberately rather than incidentally.

Stephen T. Casper Joe Kwon
0 Citations