Wenjie Wang
Publications
Toward Personalized LLM-Powered Agents: Foundations, Evaluation, and Future Directions
Large language models have enabled agents that reason, plan, and interact with tools and environments to accomplish complex tasks. As these agents operate over extended interaction horizons, their effectiveness increasingly depends on adapting behavior to individual users and maintaining continuity across time, giving rise to personalized LLM-powered agents. In such long-term, user-dependent settings, personalization permeates the entire decision pipeline rather than remaining confined to surface-level generation. This survey provides a capability-oriented review of personalized LLM-powered agents. We organize the literature around four interdependent components: profile modeling, memory, planning, and action execution. Using this taxonomy, we synthesize representative methods and analyze how user signals are represented, propagated, and utilized, highlighting cross-component interactions and recurring design trade-offs. We further examine evaluation metrics and benchmarks tailored to personalized agents, summarize application scenarios spanning general assistance to specialized domains, and outline future directions for research and deployment. By offering a structured framework for understanding and designing personalized LLM-powered agents, this survey charts a roadmap toward more user-aligned, adaptive, robust, and deployable agentic systems, accelerating progress from prototype personalization to scalable real-world assistants.
A Trajectory-Based Safety Audit of Clawdbot (OpenClaw)
Clawdbot is a self-hosted, tool-using personal AI agent with a broad action space spanning local execution and web-mediated workflows, which raises heightened safety and security concerns under ambiguity and adversarial steering. We present a trajectory-centric evaluation of Clawdbot across six risk dimensions. Our test suite samples and lightly adapts scenarios from prior agent-safety benchmarks (including ATBench and LPS-Bench) and supplements them with hand-designed cases tailored to Clawdbot's tool surface. We log complete interaction trajectories (messages, actions, tool-call arguments/outputs) and assess safety using both an automated trajectory judge (AgentDoG-Qwen3-4B) and human review. Across 34 canonical cases, we find a non-uniform safety profile: performance is generally consistent on reliability-focused tasks, while most failures arise under underspecified intent, open-ended goals, or benign-seeming jailbreak prompts, where minor misinterpretations can escalate into higher-impact tool actions. We supplemented the overall results with representative case studies and summarized the commonalities of these cases, analyzing the security vulnerabilities and typical failure modes that Clawdbot is prone to trigger in practice.
LPS-Bench: Benchmarking Safety Awareness of Computer-Use Agents in Long-Horizon Planning under Benign and Adversarial Scenarios
Computer-use agents (CUAs) that interact with real computer systems can perform automated tasks but face critical safety risks. Ambiguous instructions may trigger harmful actions, and adversarial users can manipulate tool execution to achieve malicious goals. Existing benchmarks mostly focus on short-horizon or GUI-based tasks, evaluating on execution-time errors but overlooking the ability to anticipate planning-time risks. To fill this gap, we present LPS-Bench, a benchmark that evaluates the planning-time safety awareness of MCP-based CUAs under long-horizon tasks, covering both benign and adversarial interactions across 65 scenarios of 7 task domains and 9 risk types. We introduce a multi-agent automated pipeline for scalable data generation and adopt an LLM-as-a-judge evaluation protocol to assess safety awareness through the planning trajectory. Experiments reveal substantial deficiencies in existing CUAs' ability to maintain safe behavior. We further analyze the risks and propose mitigation strategies to improve long-horizon planning safety in MCP-based CUA systems. We open-source our code at https://github.com/tychenn/LPS-Bench.
AgentDoG: A Diagnostic Guardrail Framework for AI Agent Safety and Security
The rise of AI agents introduces complex safety and security challenges arising from autonomous tool use and environmental interactions. Current guardrail models lack agentic risk awareness and transparency in risk diagnosis. To introduce an agentic guardrail that covers complex and numerous risky behaviors, we first propose a unified three-dimensional taxonomy that orthogonally categorizes agentic risks by their source (where), failure mode (how), and consequence (what). Guided by this structured and hierarchical taxonomy, we introduce a new fine-grained agentic safety benchmark (ATBench) and a Diagnostic Guardrail framework for agent safety and security (AgentDoG). AgentDoG provides fine-grained and contextual monitoring across agent trajectories. More Crucially, AgentDoG can diagnose the root causes of unsafe actions and seemingly safe but unreasonable actions, offering provenance and transparency beyond binary labels to facilitate effective agent alignment. AgentDoG variants are available in three sizes (4B, 7B, and 8B parameters) across Qwen and Llama model families. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that AgentDoG achieves state-of-the-art performance in agentic safety moderation in diverse and complex interactive scenarios. All models and datasets are openly released.