Xianmin Ye
Publications
A Model Merging Approach for Continual MLLM Unlearning
Multimodal large language model (MLLM) unlearning methods have been proposed to remove private, sensitive, or proprietary information from well-trained models. However, most existing MLLM unlearning methods are designed for one-shot requests and fail to adequately address continual scenarios, as repeatedly applying one-shot operations leads to cumulative utility degradation, unlearning rebound, and retention drift. We introduce Merging for Continual Unlearning (MCU), an approach that dynamically merges multiple one-shot unlearning adapters into a unified adapter upon receiving each new unlearning request.Through a leave-one-out merging analysis, we reveal that these unlearning adapters exhibit strong cross-task dependencies. Such dependencies have two contrasting effects: they can facilitate cross-task unlearning transferability, but they can also introduce severe interference that degrades unlearning effectiveness and compromises retained knowledge. To address this challenge, MCU projects the adapters into a shared representation space, preserves their dominant directions, suppresses over-concentrated coordinates, and reconfigures cross-task dependencies to mitigate interference while enhancing transferability. Experiments on ICU-Bench and MLLMU-Bench demonstrate that MCU achieves superior unlearning effectiveness while preserving both retained knowledge and general multimodal utility.
Salami Attack: Stealthy Collusive Memory Poisoning against OpenClaw
Long-term memory enables LLM agents to retain useful information across sessions, but also creates an attack surface through which adversaries may poison an agent's persistent memory to steer its behavior. Existing memory poisoning attacks mainly rely on individually malicious records, overlooking a compositional threat: multiple benign-looking memories may jointly induce unsafe behavior. In this paper, we introduce MemCollusion, an automated red-teaming framework for constructing collusive memory poisoning attacks. MemCollusion applies salami tactics---a strategy that slices an adversarial objective into small, individually innocuous pieces---to generate memory fragments that are individually benign looking but collectively harmful. It constructs memory coalitions using four design constraints, five theory-informed strategies, and a fine-tuned generator. To assess collusive memory poisoning in a realistic cross-session setting, we develop MoltLab, a controlled research reproduction of Moltbook, in which crafted platform content must first be observed and distilled into persistent memory before influencing the agent's behavior in a separate session. We evaluate MemCollusion on OpenClaw using two backbone models across 48 scenarios. Under the strongest memory-saving setting, MemCollusion achieves an average Memory Save Rate of 81.3% and an Attack Success Rate of 75.0%, and remains effective under both benign memory dilution and memory-level defenses.